According to Glyn Davies, the United States spokesman, the violation of the United Nations' sovereign protections in Kabul, and Najibullah’s murder, were merely “regrettable”. There was “nothing objectionable” about the new regime; its Shari’a-based regime was, he promised, was only “anti-modern”, not “anti-Western”.
In time, Davies went on, the US hoped the Taliban would “form a representative interim government that can begin the process of reconciliation nationwide”.
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President Donald Trump is reading again from that official spokesperson’s script. In return for power, Trump hopes, the Taliban will accept ceasefire that will allow the US to withdraw from the war it began after the terror attacks of 11 September, 2001. There's a catch though: Should the Taliban renege on a peace deal, and put Afghan cities to the sword, as it did in 1996, the president could be left facing public-relations ruination.
This week, Trump has been romancing Prime Minister Imran Khan and his masters in Pakistan's military, with desi wedding optics that have bewildered many. Behind the warm hugs, though, there are cold, family interests.
Islamabad has long held that the Taliban comprises ethnic-Pashtun nationalists, not global jihadists, who would be willing to allow women’s rights, democracy and political pluralism. Trump is demanding that Islamabad makes sure the Taliban learns this script before any guests arrive.
From the Doha Accord — the roadmap for peace talks signed early this month — it's clear the Taliban isn’t on board, at least not yet. The English version of the accord assures Afghan women of their fundamental “rights in political, social, economic, educational, cultural affairs". But the Pashtu version — that the Taliban insists is the official one — has no reference to women's rights at all. The English and Dari versions of the Doha Accord do not have any mention of the withdrawal of foreign forces as a precondition for peace. The Pashtu version does.
Perhaps worse, the parties have agreed to "institutionalise [an] Islamic system in the country for the implementation of comprehensive peace". This clearly suggests Afghanistan’s existing constitutional system, that claims to be based on religious principles, will be overthrown. In the Taliban’s view, moreover, an “Islamic system”.
This shouldn’t surprise anyone. Following a dialogue in Moscow early this year, a Taliban statement described the current Afghan constitution as “un-Islamic”, and labelled women’s rights “immoral”. And Taliban chief Haibatullah Akhundzada vowed in an Eid message to continue fighting until “ending the occupation and establishment of an Islamic system”.
Little imagination is needed to see why the Taliban isn't willing to embrace a republican system. From a recent report from United Nations experts, among other sources, we know the Taliban works closely with global jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda, along with Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Taiba. Younger Taliban commanders, ideologically committed to the global jihad, see anything short of total power in Afghanistan as a betrayal .
In large parts of Afghanistan, moreover, Taliban shadow governments already rule — their power cemented with generous revenue from narcotics trafficking and taxes on businesses. Few young commanders see sense in giving up that power for arrangements governed by legal norms, in which elections can change fortunes overnight.
Taliban greybeards like Abdul Gani Baradar, the outfit’s key negotiator in Doha would like to see the organisation leave politics altogether: Now that god has “given victory in the political and military fields,” he said, “instead of a desire for power, they should think about service to Islam”. Among younger commanders not provided apartments and businesses in Qatar, that isn’t a popular opinion.
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